1	STATE OF ALASKA DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION	
2	OFFICE OF TAX APPEALS PO Box 110200	
3	Juneau, Alaska 99811-0200 (907) 465-1886; Fax (907) 465-2280 BEFORE THE OFFICE OF TAX APPEALS	
4	STATE OF ALASKA	
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7	IN THE MATTER OF:)	Case No. 31-OTA-99
8	NORTHWEST MEDICAL IMAGING, INC.	Memorandum and Order Abating Corporate Income Tax Assessment
9	9112-9512	
10	j	
11	This memorandum addresses opposing motions b	
12	(NWMI), and the Department of Revenue (DOR). NWMI initiated the motion battle by filing a Motion to Prohibit Assessment ¹ of corporate income tax on the grounds that NWMI was not a corporation during the tax years at issue. DOR responded by filing a Motion to Show Cause	
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14	Why the Appeal Should Not be Dismissed and Judgment Entered Affirming the Assessment, an Opposition to the Motion to Prohibit Assessment, a Motion for Summary Judgment, and a	
15	Motion to Join James D. Pister and Virginia Pister as individuals. Oral argument on these related	
16	motions was held on January 11, 2001.	
17	This decision concludes that this appeal may be resolved on the merits as a matter of law and that the corporate income tax assessment against NWMI must be abated. DOR's opposing motions are denied.	
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19	are defined.	
20	Facts.	
21	On May 8, 1997 DOR issued a notice and demand for \$88,665 in additional corporate income tax, plus interest and penalties, that DOR determined were due under the corporate income tax returns that NWMI filed for 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994 and 1995. NWMI requested an informal conference to dispute the assessment. On October 13, 1999 DOR issued an informal conference decision that upheld the assessment of additional tax in the amount of \$31,949, plus interest, and upheld the negligence and failure to pay penalties. The additional taxes affirmed by the informal conference decision result from DOR disallowing substantial travel and rent deductions that NWMI claimed on its corporate income tax returns.	
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28	¹ The Motion to Prohibit Assessment is in substance, a mo	otion for summary judgment on the grounds that NWMI is
29	not liable for the assessed corporate income taxes for 1991	

not liable for the assessed corporate income taxes for 1991-1995 because NWMI was not a corporation at that time and I have treated it accordingly.

NWMI timely appealed the informal conference decision to the Office of Tax Appeals in November 1999, contesting the taxes and penalties assessed against its corporate income tax returns for 1991 through 1995.

In November 2000, after substantial pre-hearing discovery concerning the disputed corporate tax deductions, settlement negotiations on the tax and penalty issues, and a change in counsel for the taxpayer after its original attorney withdrew for health reasons, the taxpayer's new attorney filed a motion to prohibit the corporate income tax assessment on the grounds that NWMI is not a corporation and was not a corporation during the tax years at issue. This was the first time that the taxpayer raised the issue of its corporate status in contesting the 1997 assessment.

Public records of the State of Washington show that NWMI was issued a Certificate of Incorporation on November 10, 1988. The articles of incorporation name Dr. James Pister as the sole shareholder and director and list the purpose as providing medical radiology services to hospitals and health care providers in Alaska and Washington. The State of Washington administratively dissolved the corporation, NWMI, effective February 21, 1990. Apparently NWMI was never incorporated in Alaska.

After February 21, 1990 NWMI continued to represent itself as a corporation in conducting business. NWMI filed Alaska and Federal corporate income tax returns for the tax periods at issue, calendar years 1991 through 1995. NWMI entered into written contracts, as a corporation, with the Alaska Area Native Health Service to provide radiology services in Alaska and invoiced the Native Health Service as a corporation for services provided in 1991 through 1995. "NWMI, Inc." also entered into a lease agreement with Toyota Motor Credit Corporation to lease an automobile in Anchorage in 1994 and maintained a corporate checking account with an Anchorage bank.

In addition, Dr. James Pister told a DOR investigator in 1996 that he was employed by NWMI and that NWMI was a Washington corporation. In addition, the Notice of Appeal that NWMI filed to initiate this proceeding states that the taxpayer is a corporation formed in 1988 under the 20 laws of the State of Washington and that Dr. Pister was an employee of the corporation during the tax years at issue. However, NWMI's representatives recently discovered that NWMI lost its corporate charter under Washington law in 1989. 22

DOR's motion for an order to show cause

DOR has filed a show cause motion to require Dr. James Pister and his current and former attorneys to appear and testify under oath regarding the capacity and authority under which they have appeared and protested the assessment against NWMI, Inc. DOR argues that the corporate entity, NWMI, Inc. is the taxpayer in this proceeding and unless that corporate taxpayer is contesting the assessment then this appeal must be dismissed and the assessment affirmed. DOR contends that NWMI's representatives have effectively disclaimed that they act for NWMI, Inc., the taxpayer, by raising the claim that NWMI was not and is not incorporated. DOR does not

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argue nor is there any evidence suggesting that current counsel for NWMI is not authorized by Dr. Pister, who clearly controls NWMI, to represent the business in these proceedings.

In essence, DOR makes the same argument on the show cause motion that it does on the merits 3 in support of its cross motion for summary judgment: Since NWMI filed tax returns as a corporation and was assessed as a corporation, NWMI cannot disclaim its corporate status in appealing the assessment. The issues of whether NWMI is taxable as a de-facto corporation or is estopped from now claiming that it is not a corporation for tax purposes are appropriately 6 resolved in the context of summary judgment, not in a show cause motion concerning the real party in interest in this appeal.

8 Moreover, it seems to me that filing corporate tax returns, and being assessed additional taxes on those returns, did not bind NWMI to corporate status for tax purposes. If NWMI's 9

representatives had discovered within three years of filing the disputed corporate income tax 10 returns that NWMI, Inc. was not validly incorporated during the tax years at issue, they could have filed amended state and federal returns reflecting its status as an unincorporated entity. It stands to reason that if NWMI's representatives could have timely re-filed as an unincorporated

business, then NWMI's representatives can raise lack of corporate status as a defense to the corporate income tax assessment in this appeal without having to prove at a show cause hearing that they are in fact representing the taxpayer.

For these reasons, the Motion to Show Cause is denied.

Is NWMI subject to Alaska corporate income tax as a de-facto corporation, or as a corporation by estoppel?

The main issue presented by the cross motions for summary judgment is whether NWMI is subject to the Alaska Corporation Net Income Tax in 1991-1995 although it was not validly incorporated during those years. This appears to be a question of first impression in Alaska and is important because in 1980 Alaska repealed the state individual income tax, leaving only the corporations net income tax under AS 43.20.

NWMI argues that DOR cannot assess a corporate income tax against NWMI because NWMI lost its corporate status long before the tax years at issue and was effectively operated by Dr. Pister as a sole proprietorship. DOR argues that regardless of whether NWMI was validly incorporated, NWMI is subject to Alaska corporation income tax as a de-facto corporation, or as a corporation by estoppel, because the undisputed evidence shows that NWMI acted as a corporation, and Dr. Pister held NWMI out as a corporation for business and tax purposes during the relevant time period.

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1 DOR argues that NWMI is properly classified as a corporation under federal tax regulations that implemented the de-facto corporation doctrine and were effective during the tax years at issue.² 2 Those IRS regulations contain standards for determining whether unincorporated entities, like limited liability companies, are treated as corporations for income tax purposes. Treasury Reg. § 3 301.7701-2(a)(1), lists six characteristics of a corporation that distinguish it from partnerships 4 and other entities. These characteristics are (1) associates; (2) an objective to carry on business for profit; (3) centralization of management; (4) limited liability; (5) free transferability of 5 interest; and (6) continuity of life. The regulation provides that local law governs in determining 6 the legal relationships relevant to determining whether an entity has these corporate characteristics. 7

8 DOR contends that NWMI meets all of the standards under the regulations, except for the criterion of associates, which DOR argues is inapplicable where the business in question is 9 organized as a one man corporation. I disagree that NWMI meets the IRS standards for 10 classification as a corporation. Without incorporation, a one-man business, like NWMI, does not have any of the corporate characteristics, except carrying on a business for profit. 11

12 Clearly, NWMI fails to meet the limited liability standard for the tax years at issue because it was not validly incorporated. As DOR recognizes in its contemporaneous motion to join Dr. 13 Pister and his wife as individuals in this appeal, if NWMI was not validly incorporated Dr. Pister 14 is personally liable for the business debts of NWMI under state law. DOR can't have it both ways. If Dr. Pister is liable for NWMI's debts, and he is, then NWMI lacks the limited liability 15 requirement for classifying NWMI as a corporation for income tax purposes. 16

A company possesses the corporate characteristic of centralized management "if a person (or group of persons that does not include all of the members) has continuing exclusive authority to make management decisions reasonably necessary to the conduct of the business for which the organization was formed." Tres. Reg § 301.7701-2 (c)(1). In applying this regulation, the IRS treats a company as lacking centralized management if the members retain management control in themselves instead of appointing managers. See, BNA Multistate Tax Portfolio: State Taxation of Limited Liability Companies and Partnerships, 1995 ed. at 1560:0004. In the instant case, the undisputed evidence shows that Dr. Pister was the sole member and officer of NWMI and managed the business himself. Because NWMI had no management separate from its membership (i.e. sole member), it failed to meet the centralized management criterion for classification as a corporation under the IRS rules.

Likewise, because Dr. Pister was the sole member, manager, and person who performed the medical radiology services that constituted the business of NWMI, it is difficult to see how NWMI qualifies under the remaining corporate characteristics of continuity of life and free transferability of interests. If Dr. Pister died no member or manager would survive to continue the business or to make a transfer of his interest in any capital or profits of the business. Instead,

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² Effective January 1, 1997, the IRS adopted new rules that simplified the tax classification of unincorporated businesses by substituting a "check-the-box" classification election which allows business entities to elect to be 29 taxed as either a corporation or as a partnership on a pass-through basis.

without incorporation, NWMI would die as a business entity if its sole member and manager died.

For these reasons, I conclude that NWMI had more noncorporate characteristics than corporate 3 characteristics and more clearly resembled a sole proprietorship during the tax years at issue. Concluding that NWMI lacked the characteristics necessary for classification as a corporation for income tax purposes under the applicable IRS regulations is dispositive with respect to the issue 5 of whether NWMI can be held liable for corporate income tax for 1991 through 1995 as a defacto corporation. The answer is no.³

DOR argues that even if NWMI is not classified as a de-facto corporation under the IRS classification rules, NWMI is taxable under AS 43.20 as a corporation under the estoppel doctrine. But none of the cases that DOR cites in support of its corporation-by-estoppel argument involve an attempt to impose corporate income taxes on a business entity that was unincorporated during the tax years at issue.

The case that comes closest to the facts of this case is Group Administration Premium Services, Inc., et. al v. Commissioner, 72 TCM 834 (1996). In the GAPS case the company had conducted business since 1986 based on the belief that it was validly incorporated. After being advised in February 1989 by an attorney that the incorporation was not valid, GAPS re-filed articles of incorporation on March 1, 1989 to become validly incorporated on that date. In a dispute with the IRS over treatment of its earnings for the first two months of 1989, before GAPS was validly incorporated, the Tax Court ruled that GAPS should be treated as a corporation for the entire tax year. I do not find the GAPS case to be persuasive authority for holding an unincorporated business that was not validly incorporated at any time during the relevant tax period liable for corporate income taxes.

DOR also relies on U.S. v. Theodore Accounting Service et.al., 347 F. Supp. 1070 (D SC 1972). That case involved enforcement of an n IRS summons issued to an accounting service for tax records of some of its customers. The accounting business had represented itself as a corporation but in fact had not been validly incorporated and resisted enforcement of the summons on the grounds that it was not a corporation and the records sought were therefore personal business records. The court held that the accounting business was estopped to deny its corporate status. Given that very different fact situation, *Theodore Accounting* is not persuasive authority for imposing corporate income tax liability by estoppel on an unincorporated business.

Other cases cited by DOR in support of its estoppel argument involve businesses that were validly incorporated during the tax year at issue but argued that they should be treated for tax purposes as sole proprietorships or partnerships despite incorporation. For example, in United States.v. Scornavacco's Restaurant, 528 F. 19 (7th Cir. 1975), a family-owned restaurant business was validly incorporated in January 1969 but didn't file corporate income tax returns until 1970 and instead reported the 1969 restaurant income on the individual income tax return of

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³ There is no need to consider the effect of AS 10.06.218, which expressly abolishes the doctrine of de-facto corporations in Alaska (but clearly, this statute does not help DOR's argument.)

the family patriarch. The court rejected the taxpayer's argument that the business was in fact run as a sole proprietorship until 1970 and should be so treated for tax purposes. Instead, the court 2 found that the fact of valid incorporation in 1969 was dispositive and that the taxpayer couldn't escape the legal consequences of incorporating in January 1969. Scornavacco does not support 3 DOR's argument in this case that NWMI should be treated as a corporation for tax purposes in 1991-1995 when it was not validly incorporated but filed corporate income tax returns and called itself a corporation. 5

6 Concluding that NWMI is not liable for Alaska corporate income taxes under these circumstances is troubling because it seems to reward Dr. Pister for conduct that, at best, was 7 negligent with respect to business and tax matters. On the other hand, there is nothing in this record to indicate that Dr. Pister intentionally mislead state or federal taxing authorities concerning NWMI's corporate status. Significantly, the fact that NWMI was not validly incorporated after February 21, 1990 was a matter of public record.

More importantly, Dr. Pister did not gain any advantage with respect to Alaska tax liability by representing NWMI as a corporation after February 1990 and filing state corporate income tax returns.⁴ For Alaska tax purposes, Dr. Pister would have been better off if he had recognized NWMI's legal status as an unincorporated entity because Alaska has not imposed a personal income tax since 1980. Concluding that NWMI is not liable to the State of Alaska for income taxes on the hundreds of thousands of dollars that Dr. Pister earned by practicing medicine in Alaska during 1991-1995 because NWMI was not a corporation results from Alaska's tax structure. NWMI is only one of many profitable small businesses doing business in Alaska that do not pay state income taxes because the business is unincorporated or elects pass-through tax status.

For the reasons above, I conclude that NWMI is entitled to judgment as a matter of law that it is not liable for corporate income taxes under AS 43.20 for 1991 through 1995. DOR's motion for summary judgment on tax liability is denied on the merits and its motion to join Dr. Pister individually is denied as moot.

It is so ordered.

Dated: March 2, 2001

Administrative Law Judge

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⁴ Whether Dr. Pister gained any advantages under federal tax law by filing as a corporation, or alternatively, whether Dr. Pister is potentially liable for additional federal income taxes because NWMI was not a corporation, is not a matter of record in this appeal and is a matter for the IRS, not OTA.