BEFORE THE ALASKA OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS ON REFERRAL BY THE COMMISSIONER OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL SERVICES

In the Matter of)	
)	OAH No. 14-1436-ADQ
K L. C)	DPA/FCU No.
)	Agency No.

DECISION and ORDER

I. Introduction

K C received Food Stamp¹ benefits during 2012 -2013. The Department of Health and Social Services, Division of Public Assistance (DPA) initiated this Administrative Disqualification case against her, alleging she committed an Intentional Program Violation (IPV) of the Food Stamp program in connection with her September 25, 2012, eligibility review form.² This decision concludes that DPA proved by clear and convincing evidence that Ms. C committed her first Intentional Program Violation of the program. She must pay \$1,210 in restitution and is barred from receiving Food Stamps for twelve months.

A hearing convened in this case on September 23, 2014. DPA sent Ms. C advance notice of the hearing by both certified mail and standard First Class mail to her address of record.³ Ms. C did not attend the hearing and could not be reached at the telephone number she had provided to the program.⁴ The hearing went forward in her absence.⁵

DPA was represented at the hearing by William Schwenke, an investigator employed by DPA's Fraud Control Unit. Amy Williams, a DPA Eligibility Technician, testified on behalf of DPA.

II. Facts

Ms. C filled out a Food Stamp eligibility review form on September 25, 2012.⁶ Item 7, Money Received Information, states: "Complete if you or anyone in your household is working." Ms. C wrote, "N/A." Ms. C was working at No Name when she filled out the

Though still commonly called Food Stamps, the program is now officially known as the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program ("SNAP").

Ex. 1.

Ex. 3 - 5.

Two phone numbers were tried. The first was not a working number and the second went straight to voicemail. A message was left for Ms. C, but the OAH did not receive a call back.

Once proper notice has been given, the Food Stamp regulations allow a hearing to be held without the participation of the household member alleged to have committed the IPV. See 7 CFR § 273.16(e)(4). The same regulations set out circumstances under which the recipient may seek to vacate this decision if there was good cause for the failure to appear.

⁶ Ex. 7.

⁷ Ex. 7, pg. 2.

recertification application. Alaska Department of Labor records noted that Ms. C was employed at No Name in the 4th Quarter of 2012. No Name records verify that Ms. C began working on September 21, 2012.

Because Ms. C failed to report the income described above, DPA issued Ms. C excessive Food Stamps benefits from November 2012 through April 2013. The total overpayment amount is \$1,210. This is Ms. C's first IPV. 14

III. Discussion

It is prohibited by federal law for a person to obtain Food Stamp benefits by making false or misleading statements or by concealing or withholding facts. ¹⁵ In this case, DPA seeks to establish a first IPV, and to do so DPA must prove the elements of that IPV by clear and convincing evidence. ¹⁶

Federal Food Stamp law provides that a twelve-month disqualification must be imposed on any individual found to have committed a first IPV. ¹⁷ An intentional program violation is defined as "having intentionally . . . made a false or misleading statement, or misrepresented, concealed or withheld facts" in connection with the program. ¹⁸

It is clear that Ms. C was working at No Name when she filled out her September 25, 2012, recertification application and did not report that employment to DPA.¹⁹ This was a misrepresentation. The remaining issue is whether the misrepresentation was intentional.

Ms. C failed to appear for or testify at her hearing, but her intent can be inferred from circumstantial evidence. It is highly unlikely that Ms. C did not remember she began working at No Name four days before she filled out her recertification application. The evidence is clear and convincing that Ms. C's misrepresentation was intentional and she has therefore committed her first IPV.

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Ex. 7, pg. 2.
         Ex. 11
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11
         Ex. 11. Ms. C remained employed at No Name as of May 12, 2013.
12
         Ex. 12; Williams testimony.
13
         Ex. 12.
14
         Ex. 1; Schwenke testimony.
15
         See, 7 U.S.C. § 2015(b).
16
         7 C.F.R. § 273.16(e)(6).
17
         7 C.F.R. § 273.16(b)(1)(i).
18
         7 C.F.R. § 273.16(c)(1).
         Ex. 7. pg. 2.
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IV. Conclusion and Order

Ms. C has committed a first Intentional Program Violation of the Food Stamp program. She is disqualified from receiving Food Stamp benefits for a twelve-month period, and is required to reimburse DPA for benefits that were overpaid as a result of the IPV. The Food Stamp disqualification period shall begin December 1, 2014. This disqualification applies only to Ms. C, and not to any other individuals who may be included in her household. For the duration of the disqualification period, Ms. C's needs will not be considered when determining Food Stamp eligibility and benefit amounts for her household. However, she must report her income and resources so that they can be used in these determinations.

DPA shall provide written notice to Ms. C regarding the disqualification and reimbursement requirement.²⁴

Dated this 20th day of October, 2014.

Signed
Bride Seifert
Administrative Law Judge

Adoption

The undersigned, by delegation from the Commissioner of Health and Social Services, adopts this Decision, under the authority of AS 44.64.060(e)(1), as the final administrative determination in this matter.

Judicial review of this decision may be obtained by filing an appeal in the Alaska Superior Court in accordance with Alaska R. App. P. 602(a)(2) within 30 days after the date of this decision.

DATED this 6th day of November, 2014.

By: <u>Signed</u>
Name: <u>Bride Seifert</u>
Title/Division: <u>ALJ/OAH</u>

[This document has been modified to conform to the technical standards for publication.]

²⁰ 7 C.F.R. § 273.16(b)(1)(i); 7 C.F.R. § 273.16(b)(12); 7 C.F.R. § 273.16(e)(8)(iii).

See 7 C.F.R. § 273.16(b)(13) and (e)(8)(i); Garcia v. Concannon, 67 F.3d 256, 259 (9th Cir. 1995). Insofar as 273.16(e)(9)(ii) is inconsistent with this result, it must be disregarded as contrary to statute, as discussed in Garcia and in Devi v. Senior and Disabled Serv. Div., 905 P.2d 846 (Or. App. 1995).

²² 7 C.F.R. § 273.16(b)(11).

²³ 7 C.F.R. § 273.11(c)(1).

²⁴ 7 C.F.R. § 273.16(e)(9)(ii); 7 C.F.R. § 273.18(d)(3).